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The Union Wage Effect Re-Examined 
Dennis Maki 
and 
Sandra Christensen 
In thispaper, the authors extend the literature on union wage 
effect in two ways. They use aggregate industry data in a 
simultaneous-equations model to provide an estima te for the 
union wage effect in Canada which recognizes the endogenity of 
union coverages. And they suggest a possible cause for the dif-
férence in results obtained for the U.S. by Ashenfelter and 
Johnson, on the one hand, and Kahn on the other. 
In 1963, H.G. Lewis published a comprehensive review of U.S. studies 
which attempted to measure the extent to which the wage rates of union 
workers exceeded those of nonunion workers. He concluded that, on 
average, the wage rates of union workers were 10 to 15 percent above those 
of nonunion workers, at least for the 1957-58 period. Since that time, a 
number of additional U.S. studies hâve been made which hâve benefited 
from the more extensive data on labor force and industry characteristics 
now available. Thèse later studies hâve yielded a wide range of estimâtes for 
the union-nonunion wage differential, but most of them are in excess of the 
10 to 15 percent effect suggested by Lewis.1 
However, in 1972, Orley Ashenfelter and George Johnson published an 
innovative study of the union wage effect in U.S. manufacturing industries 
in which they challenge the validity of the single-equation estimation 
methods used in previous studies. They argue that if the union wage effect is 
as large as récent studies indicate, it is difficult to understand why so much 
of the work force remains unorganized. They suggest that the large 
estimâtes obtained might be the resuit of simultaneous équation bias, due to 
the inaccuracy of the usual model in which union coverage and labor quality 
are treated as exogenous déterminants of wages. They develop an alter-
native model in which the extent of union coverage, labor quality, and 
wages are jointly dépendent. Their OLS estimate of their wage équation in-
* MAKI, Dennis and Sandra CHRISTENSEN, Professors, Department of Economies 
and Commerce, Simon Fraser University, B.C. 
î See EVANS and MACDONALD (1976), tables 1 and 2, for a summary of thèse 
results. 
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dicates a large and significant union wage effect. However, when they ob-
tain 2-3SLS estimâtes, in which the union coverage and labor quality 
variables in the wage équation are treated as endogenous variables, the 
estimated union wage effect drops in value and is statistically nonsignifi-
cant. This suggests that the usual single-equation resuit of a large and 
significant positive union effect on wages gives unions too much crédit for 
raising wages because the variable for union coverage also picks up reverse 
causality running from wages to union coverage. 
In subséquent studies that hâve adopted the simultaneous-equations 
approach suggested by Ashenfelter and Johnson, the results for the union 
effect on wages hâve been mixed. A study by Kahn (1979), using aggregate 
U.S. industry data (as did Ashenfelter and Johnson), finds a large and 
significant union wage effect even when the endogeneity of union coverage 
is recognized. A study by Schmidt and Strauss (1979), using individual data, 
finds a small union wage effect which drops to nonsignificance when en-
dogeneity of union coverage is recognized; but studies by Lee (1978) and 
Leigh (1978), which also use individual data, find the union wage effect re-
mains large and significant. 
We are aware of only three Canadian studies which attempt to estimate 
the union wage effect.2 Each of thèse finds a positive and significant union 
wage effect of about 20 percent, but each uses only the conventional single 
wage équation approach. In this paper, we extend the literature in two 
ways: 1) we use aggregate industry data in a simultaneous-equations model 
to provide an estimate for the union wage effect in Canada which recognizes 
the endogeneity of union coverage; and 2) we suggest a possible cause for 
the différence in results obtained for the U.S. by Ashenfelter and Johnson, 
on the one hand, and Kahn on the other. 
A note of caution is in order prior to the présentation of our model and 
empirical results. The statistical problems inhérent in estimating the effect 
of unions on wages are many. The reader may refer to Reder (1965) for a 
full discussion of thèse problems. We outline hère just two of the problems 
which can arise because they may contribute to the disparity between our 
results and those obtained in some other récent studies. 
First, ail those studies which, like ours, use aggregate industry data are 
constrained by the nature of the available wage or earnings statistics. Such 
data are reported in terms of industry averages, so that the effect of unions 
on those establishments within the industry which are unionized may be 
2 See KUMAR (1972), STARR (1973), and EVANS and MACDONALD (1976). 
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swamped in the average figure by the présence of many unorganized 
establishments. This means that there may be considérable variation in the 
size of the union wage effect estimated in différent studies arising solely 
from différences in the level of industry aggregation in the data used. In this 
context, our use of three and four digit industries should be préférable to 
the two-digit industrial classification used in some other studies. 
Second, unions may affect wages not only in those establishments 
which are unionized but also in nonunion establishments which hire in the 
same labor market. The effect of unions on nonunion wages may be either 
to raise them, as nonunion employers attempt to forestall unionization (the 
"threat effect"); or to lower them, as workers displaced by the higher wages 
in the union sector flood the nonunion sector (the "displacement" effect). 
Our estimate of the union wage effect is an estimate of the differential 
which would exist after threat and displacements adjustments in the nonu-
nion sector hâve taken place. A discussion of the difficulties involved in 
separating out threat and displacement effects, and an empirical attempt to 
do so, are contained in the study by Gerald Starr (1973) for the Ontario 
Ministry of Labor. 
SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
We estimate the following three-equation model, in which wages, 
union coverage, and labor quality are endogenous: 
(1) In W = a0 + aj U 4- a2ELT9 + a3 F + a4 LAGPROF + a5 ONT + 
a$ QUE + a7 PRA + ag BC + ej 
(2) U = b0 + bj In W + b2 ELT9 + b3 BIGEMP + b4 ONT + b5 QUE 
QUE + b6 PRA + b7 BC + e2 
(3) ELT9 = c0 + q In W + c2 URBAN + c3 OLD55 + c4 ONT + c5 
QUE + c6 PRA + C7 BC + e3. 
Our data set is for 1974, and includes only production workers in 
Canadian manufacturing industries. The 40 industries included in our sam-
ple were ail those, for which the necessary data were available.3 
3 A complète list of the industries included together with variable définitions, sources, 
and a listing of the data are included in the attached appendix. 
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The variables are defined as follows: 
W = average wage for production workers in a given industry, 
measured empirically as gross earnings of production 
workers divided by manhours worked; 
U = proportion of production workers covered by a collective 
agreement; 
ELT9 = proportion of production workers with éducation less than 
grade 9 (1971); 
F = proportion of production workers that are female; 
LAGPROF = percent profit before tax (1973); 
BIGEMP = proportion of workers in establishments employing 200 or 
more; 
URBAN = proportion of workers residing in Census Metropolitan 
Areas (1971); 
OLD55 = proportion of workers who are 55 or older (1971); 
ONT = proportion of establishments located in Ontario; 
QUE = proportion of establishments located in Québec; 
PRA = proportion of establishments located in the Prairie pro-
vinces; 
BC = proportion of establishments located in British Columbia. 
THE WAGE EQUATION (1) 
The spécification for the équation explaining average industry wage 
can be justified by viewing it as the reduced-form equilibrium relationship 
resulting from a simple labor market model. Hence, its arguments should be 
the nonwage déterminants of labor demand and supply. Consequently, we 
include variables for union coverage (U), since the existence of a collective 
bargaining relationship can be expected to affect the offer price of labor; 
for the proportion of workers who are female (F), since this could pick up 
either demand effects based on employer discrimination or supply effects 
based on male-female différences in offer price; for the industry's profit 
rate over the previous year (LAGPROF), since this is indicative of the 
employées "ability to pay" and may also indicate increased demand for 
labor due to industry expansion; and for labor quality (ELT9), since this af-
fects productivity and hence the demand for labor. In the empirical 
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spécification for labor quality, it is customary to use a measure for average 
éducation. We use the proportion of workers who hâve not completed grade 
9. We think this is conceptually superior to average éducation because, in 
our sample of production workers in manufacturing, the main effect of 
éducation on earnings is probably as an indicator of trainability. In 
Canada, completion of grade 10 is a prerequisite for entry into many ap-
prenticeship programs, and hence not completing grade 10 would hâve been 
the most appropriate measure. The grade 9 measure is the closest we could 
corne with available data. 
Equation (1) is similar to those estimated in previous studies of the 
union wage effect, using OLS. However, the équation includes some 
variables for which arguments of reverse causation can be made, making 
OLS estimation biased, even asymptotically. In particular, greater union 
coverage may not only raise the average wage in an industry; it may also be 
that higher wage industries are more likely to be unionized, since workers in 
such industries hâve more to protect. Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972, pp. 
491-492) explain this as the resuit of increased demand by high wage (and 
hence high income) workers for ail normal goods, including union services. 
Further, although a relatively high quality labor force in an industry 
nécessitâtes relatively high wages, it may also be that a high wage industry 
will attract a relatively high quality labor force since it can choose the 
"cream of the crop" among job seekers. Because of the existence of this 
two-way causation between dépendent and independent variables in the 
wage équation, we must go on to specify équations for union coverage and 
labor quality in order to obtain consistent estimâtes from the model. 
THE UNION COVERAGE EQUATION (2) 
As before, an appropriate spécification for this équation can be obtain-
ed by viewing it as the reduced-form equilibrium relationship resulting from 
a simple demand and supply model for union services. As indicatecl earlier, 
we would expect the workers' demand for union services to vary directly 
with the industry wage level (In W), since workers in high wage industries 
hâve more to protect; and with our inverse measure of éducation (ELT9), 
since the least-educated or least-skilled workers hâve the least potential for 
gains from individual bargaining. We would expect the supply of union ser-
vices to vary directly with the size of potential bargaining units within the 
industry (BIGEMP), since this reduces the cost-to-benefit ratio of organiza-
tional efforts. 
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THE LABOR QUALITY (Education) Equation (3) 
As indicated earlier, we expect our inverse éducation measure to be 
negatively related to the average industry wage (In W), since employer s with 
relatively attractive pay scales can be very sélective in hiring, thus building 
up a relatively high quality labor force. Further, we would expect other 
déterminants of the educational mix of an industry's labor force to include 
the âge of the labor force (OLD55), since near-universal éducation at least 
through high school is a post-World War II phenomenon in Canada; and 
urban location (URBAN), since the average educational attainment of the 
population tends to be higher in urban than rural areas. Finally, we include 
régional controls in this and the other two équations. The Atlantic pro-
vinces serve as the référence group, with controls explicitly entered for On-
tario (ONT), Québec (QUE), the Prairie provinces (PRA), and British Col-
umbia (BC). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Our estimation results for the three équations are presented in Tables 1, 
2, and 3. Our primary interest is in the coefficient attached to the union 
coverage variable in the wage équation. From Table 1, it is clear that we do 
not find that the estimated union wage effect drops to nonsignificance once 
the endogeneity of union coverage in the wage équation is recognized. In 
fact, there is no significant différence in the estimâtes we obtain for the 
coefficient of U, whether the estimâtes are obtained from OLS; from 
2-3SLS in a two-equation model where wages and union coverage are joint-
ly determined; or from 2-3 SLS in a three-equation model where labor quali-
ty is added as a third jointly determined variable. While there is évidence, in 
Table 2, of significant reverse causality running from wages to union 
coverage, allowance for this reverse causality in our estimation procédure 
does not destroy or even significantly weaken the causal relationship runn-
ing from union coverage to wages. 
Using the approach first developed by Lewis (1963), an estimate of the 
union-nonunion wage differential, defined as: 
d = (W u -W n ) /W n = (W u /W n ) -1 , 
can be derived from the coefficient attached to the union coverage variable 
in the wage équation.4 Since équation (1) says that: 
In W = aQ + ai U + aX 
4 This assumes the differential is constant across industries. 
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where X = ail other explanatory variables for In W, it follows that: 
H/ a i U K 
W = e l e 
where K = ao + a X. Hence: 
ai K Wu = e 1 e since U = 1 for a completely unionized industry; 
O K 
Wn = e e since U = 1 for a nonunionized industry; 
andd = (Wu/Wn) - 1 = e*1 - 1. 
Our three-equation 3SLS estimate of aj is .412, which implies an 
estimated union-nonunion wage differential of 51 percent. However, it 
should be noted that our calculated value for Wn, the average wage in an in-
dustry with no union coverage, involves extrapolation of our results far out-
side the range of union coverage values contained in our sample.5 Hence, we 
can hâve little confidence in the value calculated for Wn, and therefore our 
confidence in the accuracy of the large union-nonunion wage differential we 
hâve obtained is also very low. Similar problems exist with virtually ail ag-
gregate industry studies of this type. This is probably a large part of the ex-
planation for the wide range of estimâtes reported for the union-nonunion 
differential, even from single-equation studies. 
However, our results can be used with more confidence to assess the 
différence in average industry wage to be expected when comparing one 
highly unionized industry to another which differs only in being slightly 
more (or less) unionized. For example our results indicate that, for two 
otherwise identical industries, a 0.10 différence in the proportion of 
workers covered by a union contract would be accompanied by an average 
wage differential of 4.2 percent. 
Our results contradict those obtained for the U.S. by Ashenfciter and 
Johnson, since our results show that the effect of unions in raising average 
industry wages remains large and significant even after the endogeneity of 
union coverage and labor quality is accounted for in the estimation pro-
cédure. However, our results are very similar to those reported by Kahn, 
who obtained a highly significant 3SLS estimate of.55 for the coefficient of 
5 The lowest value for U in our sample is .17; only 3 of the 40 industries in our sample 
hâve U values less than .50. At the other extrême, 10 out of the 40 hâve U values between .90 
and .99. 
TABLE 1 
Estimated Régression Coefficients for Wage Equation 
Estimation 
Procédure 
Dépendent 
Variable U 
Coefficients of 
ELT9 F LAGPROF ONT QUE PRA BC CONST tf SEE 
OLS In W .455** 
(.095) 
-.646** 
(.197) 
-.499** 
(.087) 
.009* 
(.004) 
-.026 
(.163) 
.348* 
(.158) 
.389 
(.217) 
.512 
(.280) 
1.190** 
(.205) 
.896 .084 
2 eqn. 2SLS In W .533** 
(.119) 
-.664** 
(.200) 
-.482** 
(.089) 
.009* 
(.004) 
-.040 
(.165) 
.381* 
(.162) 
.404 
(.220) 
.511 
(.283) 
1.128** 
(.215) 
.894 .085 
2 eqn 3SLS In W .533** 
(.119) 
-.674** 
(.199) 
-.491** 
(.088) 
.007* 
(.004) 
-.049 
(.164) 
.384* 
(.162) 
.398 
(.220) 
.504 
(.283) 
1.147** 
(.213) 
3 eqn 2SLS In W .452** 
(.166) 
-1.696** 
(.529) 
-.377** 
(.131) 
.003 
(.007) 
-.539 
(.315) 
.205 
(.236) 
-.147 
(.387) 
.156 
(.419) 
1.919** 
(.456) 
.800 .117 
3 eqn 3SLS l n W 
at the .01 level 
at the .05 level 
.412** 
(.111) 
-1.779** 
(.502) 
-.348** 
(.093) 
.006* 
(.003) 
-.568 
(.304) 
.166 
(.232) 
-.199 
(.379) 
.134 
(.415) 
1.985** 
(.432) 
** Significant 
* Significant 
Standard errors are in parenthèses. The 2 équation model does not include the équation for labor quality (ELT 9). Tests for the coefficients of U, 
ELT9, F, and LAGPROF are 1-tailed; others are 2-tailed since no sign was hypothesized. The set of régional controls is significant at the .05 level. 
TABLE 2 
Estimated Régression Coefficients for Union Coverage Equation 
Estimated 
Procédure 
Dépendent 
Variable InW ELT9 
Coefficients of 
BIGEMP ONT QUE PRA BC CONST R? SEE 
OLS U .356** 
(.109) 
.608** 
(.217) 
.428** 
(.071) 
.127 
(.167) 
-.387* 
(.154) 
-.100 
(.234) 
-.248 
(.303) 
-.124 
(.256) 
.802 .088 
2 eqn 2SLS U .353** 
(.138) 
.605** 
(.231) 
.429** 
(•075) 
.127 
(.167) 
-.387* 
(.154) 
-.098 
(.238) 
-.245 
(.314) 
-.119 
(.286) 
.802 .088 
2 eqn 3SLS U .353** 
(.138) 
.605** 
(.231) 
.429** 
(.075) 
.127 
(.167) 
-.387* 
(.154) 
-.098 
(.238) 
-.245 
(.314) 
-.119 
(.286) 
3 eqn 2SLS u .472* 
(.221) 
1.140* 
(.656) 
.414** 
(.085) 
.350 
(.300) 
-.338 
(.177) 
.099 
(.315) 
-.150 
(.341) 
-.607 
(.658) 
.764 .096 
3 eqn 3SLS u .499* 
(.214) 
1.256* 
(.640) 
.418** 
(.077) 
.396 
(.296) 
-.326 
(.177) 
.141 
(.313) 
-.135 
(.341) 
-.718 
(.642) 
** Signifîcant at the .01 level 
* Signifîcant at the .05 level 
Standard errors are in parenthèses. The 2 équation model does not include the équation for labor quality (ELT9). Tests for In W, ELT9 and 
BIGEMP are 1-tailed; others are 2-tailed since no sign was hypothesized. The set of régional controls is significant at the .01 level. Because the wage 
équation is just identifîed in our two-equation spécification, there is no gain in efficiency of estimation for the union coverage équation as we move 
from 2SLS to 3SLS. See A.S. GOLDBERGER (1964), p. 352. 
TABLE 3 
Estimated Régression Coefficients for Labor Quality Equation 
Estimation 
Procédure 
Dépendent 
Variable In W URBAN 
Coefficients of 
OLD55 ONT QUE PRA BC CONST Ri SEE 
OLS ELT9 -.214** 
(.067) 
-.126* 
(.072) 
.593 
(.464) 
-.239 
(.133) 
.022 
(.129) 
-.224 
(.183) 
-.067 
(.236) 
.788* 
(.152) 
.703 .067 
3 eqn 2SLS ELT9 -.247** 
(.074) 
-.127* 
(.073) 
.569 
(.466) 
-.224 
(.134) 
.019 
(.129) 
-.189 
(.186) 
-.014 
(.242) 
.825** 
(.156) 
.701 .067 
3 eqn 3SLS ELT9 -.250** 
(.073) 
-.129* 
(.068) 
.395 
(.240) 
-.235 
(.134) 
.013 
(.129) 
-.188 
(.183) 
-.009 
(.240) 
.860** 
(.135) 
** Signiflcant at the .01 level 
* Signiflcant at the .05 level 
Standard errors are in parenthèses. Tests for In W, URBAN, and OLD55 are 1-tailed; others are 2-tailed since no sign was hypothesized. 
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the union coverage variable. Kahn (1979, p. 528) spéculâtes that the dif-
férence between his results and those of Ashenfelter and Johnson is caused 
by Kahn's inclusion of a fourth endogenous variable, production technique 
(SK), in the model. However, this seems unlikely to be the explanation, for 
two reasons://'rs/, because our results are similar to Kahn's although we use 
only a three-equation model similar to that of Ashenfelter and Johnson; 
and second, because Kahn's estimation results show that a) he fails to find 
any variables which contribute significantly to the explanation of his pro-
duction technique variable (SK); b) SK is not a significant variable in any of 
the other three équations in his model. Hence, the reasonable conclusion 
would seem to be that the addition of that fourth endogenous variable to 
the three-equation model used by Ashenfelter and Johnson contributes 
nothing to the results. 
We tentatively suggest an alternative explanation for the différence bet-
ween both Kahn's results and ours, on the one hand, and those of 
Ashenfelter and Johnson on the other. It appears that the model used by 
Ashenfelter and Johnson is underspecified, given the significant coefficients 
estimated for the additional explanatory variables we hâve included in the 
équations. Further, Ashenfelter and Johnson hâve only 19 (two-digit) in-
dustries in their sample. By contrast, our sample includes 40 (three-digit) in-
dustries, and Kahn's sample includes 49 (three-digit) industries. It is well 
known that simultaneous-equation estimation techniques are very sensitive 
to spécification error. That, together with the small degrees of freedom in 
estimation, make it unsurprising that the results obtained by Ashenfelter 
and Johnson are unstable and weak. 
ADDITIONAL RESULTS 
In an attempt to investigate further some of the sources of instability 
between studies in the estimation of the union-nonunion wage differential, 
three supplementary estimations were performed. In the first of thèse, we 
attempted a rough test of the explanation we suggested at the end of the 
preceding section for the weak and unstable results obtained by Ashenfelter 
and Johnson. The test was made in three parts. First, we arbitrarily divided 
our sample of 40 industries into two samples of 20 industries each by selec-
ting every other industry from the SIC list, and we estimated our wage équa-
tion (1) for each of thèse two sub-samples. Second, we reduced the 
spécification of our three-equation model to one which was as nearly as 
possible comparable to that used by Ashenfelter and Johnson. In the wage 
équation we retained only the variables U, ELT9, and F; in the union 
coverage équation we retained only lnW and BIGEMP; in the labor quality 
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TABLE 4 
Estimated Régression Coefficient for the Union Coverage Variable 
from 20-industry sub-samples 
A. Using the fully-specified model: 
Sample 1 Sample 2 
OLS .740** .472** 
(.189) (.193) 
2 eqn. 2SLS .703** .674** 
(.222) (.296) 
2 eqn. 3SLS .673 .622* 
(.221) (.292) 
3 eqn. 2SLS .565* .261 
(.309) (.641) 
3 eqn. 3SLS .530** .609 
(.216) (.409) 
B. Using the under-specified model: 
Sample 1 Sample 2 Full sample 
OLS .422* .265* .316** 
(.193) (.124) (.103) 
2 eqn. 2SLS .444* .372* .428** 
(.224) (.162) (.131) 
2 eqn. 3SLS .497* .376* .450** 
(.223) (.163) (.131) 
3 eqn. 2SLS .403 .387* .385** 
(.265) (.194) (.138) 
3 eqn. 3SLS .471* .423* .451** 
(.260) 
.01 level 
(.178) (.134) 
** Significant at the 
* Significant at the .05 level 
Standard errors are in parenthèses. The tests are 1-tailed. 
équation we retained only URBAN and OLD55. We estimated this 
underspecified model with our full 40 industry sample. Finally, we 
estimated the underspecified model for each of the 20-industry sub-samples. 
Thèse results, for the union coverage coefficient only, are presented in 
Table 4. Our results seem to indicate that underspecification, by itself, is 
not sufficient to explain the instability of results obtained by Ashenfelter 
and Johnson, since our estimâtes of the underspecified équation for the full 
40-industry sample remain large, fairly stable in value, and statistically 
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significant as we move from OLS to 2-3SLS techniques. The estimâtes for 
our fully-specified model obtained from the 20-industry sub-samples, 
however, demonstrate considerably greater instability, with generally 
smaller t-values, falling to insignificance for one of the sub-samples as we 
move to 2-3SLS for the three-equation model. This would appear to in-
dicate that it is the small degrees of freedom available in the Ashenfelter and 
Johnson study which led to their weak and unstable results. However, when 
we combine the problems of small sample size with underspecification of 
the model, we find the perplexing resuit that there is somewhat less instabili-
ty in the value of the estimâtes, compared to the small-sample estimâtes ob-
tained for the more fully-specified model, although significance levels are 
generally lower. 
Our second supplementary estimation involved comparability with the 
previous Canadian studies by Kumar (1972) and Evans/MacDonald (1976) 
which used aggregate industry data. Both of thèse studies included a pro-
ductivity variable in the wage équation, defined as value-added per 
manhour, and found it to be statistically significant. In an attempt to check 
whether our omission of this variable could explain the différence between 
our results and those of Kumar and Evans/MacDonald, we introduced it in-
to our équation (1) as an additional variable. Results of OLS estimation in-
dicated the value-added per man hour variable was nonsignificant (with a t 
value less than unity), and the coefficient of U was virtually unaffected by 
the addition of the productivity measure. 
The third supplementary estimation entailed the estimation of various 
functional forms for the wage équation, a procédure suggested by Addison 
and Siebert (1979, pp. 271-2) as being reasonable. By and large thèse estima-
tions confirmed that équation (1) was as good a functional form as any, but 
one variant suggested by Addison and Siebert, involving the addition of a 
U2 term, produced interesting results: 
(4) In W = 1.544** - .755U + .900 U2** - .578ELT9** - ,513F** 
(.213) (.396) (.288) (.175) (.077) 
+ .0112 LAGPROF** - .00344 ONT + .266 QUE 
+ (.00393) (.144) (.142) 
+ .448 PRA + .400 BC* 
(.248) (.192) 
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Standard errors are in parenthèses; asterisks indicate significance levels as in 
table 1. The interesting aspect of équation (4) is that it yields an estimate of 
the union-nonunion differential of only 16 percent. This results because the 
équation indicates the union wage is below the nonunion wage until the in-
dustry becomes approximately 42 percent unionized. While such an effect is 
conceivable,7 we hâve only two observations involving an industry with less 
than 42 percent union coverage. Thèse results underpin our previous con-
clusion that our estimâtes of the union-nonunion differential are tenuous 
because the nonunion wage is not estimable with précision from our data 
set. 
CONCLUSION 
The initial motivation for this study was derived from a paper by 
Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) in which they argue: 1) that the single wage 
équation model typically used to estimate the effect of union coverage on 
wages is inaccurate due to the présence of endogenous variables among the 
explanatory variables; and 2) that the estimated effect of union coverage on 
wages is small and nonsignificant when obtained from a more accurate 
simultaneous-equations model. Our results confirm point (1), but réfute 
point (2). We do find strong évidence of joint dependence among the wage 
rate and two of its explanatory variables, union coverage and labor quality. 
However, allowance for this joint dependence in estimation does not reduce 
the estimated effect of union coverage on wages to nonsignificance. We 
continue to find a large and significant union wage effect. Our estimation 
results imply that the average wage for production workers in manufactur-
ing industries is higher by 4.2 percent in response to a différence of 0.10 in 
union coverage (as measured by the proportion of ail production workers 
covered by a collective bargaining agreement). Our results also imply an 
6 This resuit is obtained as follows: 
d(ln W) = .412 dU 
or 
lnW1 - l n W ° = .412 (.10) 
lnfW^/W0) = .0412 
w l / w 0 = e.0412 = 1 0 4 2 1 
W1 = 1.0421 W° 
7 The "threat effect" may be small for low levels of unionization in an industry, allow-
ing the "displacement effect" to more than offset (in the calculation of average union plus 
nonunion wages in the industry) the direct effect of unions on the wages of covered workers. 
See JOHNSON and MIESZKOWSKI (1970). 
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overall union-nonunion wage differential of 51 percent, but the accuracy of 
this figure dépends critically on the accuracy with which we can estiimate the 
average wage in an industry with no unionization. Because our sample in-
cludes no such industries and in fact contains only 3 (out of 40) industries 
with union coverage rates below 50 percent, we place little confidence in our 
estimate for the overall differential. 
Additional estimation results were obtained in an effort to uncover the 
reasons for the disparate estimâtes of the union wage effect obtained in this 
and previous (U.S. and Canadian) studies. While thèse results were not 
clear-cut, it seems that différences in model spécification, in industries 
selected for inclusion, and in sample size could ail bear some responsibility. 
However, our results were fairly robust through ail the expérimental varia-
tions we tried. We suspect, though could not test with our data set, that a 
major cause of the disparity in estimâtes of the union wage effect obtained 
to date is the differing levels of aggregation on which the various estimâtes 
hâve been based. 
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Data Appendix 
The 40 industries in our sample, listed below, include some two, three, and four 
digit manufacturing industries. Our sélection criterion was a pragmatic one; we in-
cluded ail those manufacturing industries for which the needed data were available. 
List of Industries in the Sample 
1970 SIC Name 
1011 Slaughtering and Méat Processing 
102 Fish Products 
104 Dairy Products 
1071 Biscuit Manufacturers 
1072 Bakeries 
1081 Confectionery Manufacturers 
1091 Soft Drink Manufacturers 
1093 Breweries 
15 Tobacco Products 
162 Rubber Products 
174 Shoe Factories 
182 Wool, Yarn, and Cloth Mills 
183 Man Made Fibre, Yarn, and Cloth Mills 
23 Knitting Mills 
243 Men's Clothing 
245 Children's Clothing 
251 Sawmills, Planing Mills and Shingle Mills 
252 Veneer and Plywood Mills 
271 Pulp and Paper Mills 
273 Paper Box and Bag Manufacturers 
289 Publishing and Printing 
291 Iron and Steel Mills 
294 Iron Foundaries 
301 Boiler and Plate Works 
302 Fabricated Structural Métal 
304 Métal Stamping, Pressing and Coating 
305 Wire and Wire Products Manufacturers 
307 Heating Equipment Manufacturers 
311 Agricultural Implements 
315 Miscellaneous Machinery and Equipment Manufacturers 
321 Aircraft and Aircraft Parts Manufacturers 
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323 Motor Vehicle Manufacturer 
325 Motor Vehicle Parts and Accessory Manufacturers 
327 Shipbuilding and Repair 
331 Manufacturers of Small Electrical Appliances 
332 Manufacturers of Major Appliances (Electric and Non-Electric) 
334 Manufacturers of Household Radio and Télévision Receivers 
336 Manufacturers of Electrical Industrial Equipment 
36 Petroleum and Coal Products 
375 Paint and Varnish Manufacturers 
Notes on Sample Data 
The data for profit and percent covered by collective agreements are reported by 
1960 SIC, and were converted using the table in the 1970 Standard Classification 
Manual ( 12-501). However, since the SIC numbers were not specified and, for 
some industries, names did not exactly correspond, interpretive judgement was exer-
cised. 
Census data (for Education, Age and Urbanization) are published by 1970 SIC 
by 3 digit industry. Since some of the 1960 SIC industries become 4 digit industries in 
the 1970 SIC, data for those industries for the above variables were proxied with the 
appropriate 3 digit ratios. Further, census séries combined industries 323 and 325; 
each of thèse is proxied by the ratio of the two combined. 
Variable Définitions and Data Sources 
U Percent of Non-office Employées ("those non-supervisory workers 
directly engaged in the production of goods or services and the provi-
sion of maintenance and auxiliary services closely associated with 
production opérations") covered by collective agreements; from 
Labour Canada, Working Conditions in Canadian Industry 1974. 
Surveyed are firms with 20 or more employées in the year ending 1 
October 1974, with some exceptions covering smaller firms. 
W Wages Paid (gross earnings of employées before déductions for in-
come tax and employée contributions to unemployment insurance, 
pensions, etc.) divided by manhours worked, for Production and 
Related Workers (those engaged in production and assembling ac-
tivities, in storing, inspecting, handling, packing, warehousing, etc. 
and those engaged in maintenance, repair, janitorial and watchmen 
services, and line supervisors engaged in similar work to that of the 
employées they supervise); from Statistics Canada, Manufacturing 
Industries of Canada, 1974, 31-203. 
ONT Number of Establishments located in Ontario, Québec, The Prairie 
QUE Provinces, and British Columbia, respectively, as a ratio to the total 
THE UNION WAGE EFFECT RE-EXAMINED 227 
S o © ~ © - « o < 5 ~ c 5 ' - < © © © © © O f s m ~ © - * - « - « c 5 - « © - * o © 
«r <N -* *n «r> -* j£ <S «S © -H «S • * * v o © « / - > 5 ^ - H < N < N < N O O T f r r - 0 0 < N m © ' « 1 - v > - H « n © « / - > H W Ô O O O O O - H O O O O O W r t r t r t r t - H O - H ^ 
3 N N - m N n m o « N V ) ^ i n \ q < o o o n r n m r j q m N r j N r j « ^ ^ 
O» 
O 
"o r n ^ « n r n r n r n f s | c ^ ^ t » - H r o v O r r > f n T | - f n ' ^ - » - < ' ^ - © < s < s r - - ' ^ , < N ^ « s r s o o 
> m r t r t O O < n t t m m » « H ( S N v i O O \ m n y o i r i m m m O » m O \ 
*^ ^ ^ t ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ''i 'l ^ ^ °^  1 t ^ °^  ^ ^ ^ ^ °^  ^ .^ °^  ^ 
ft, a \ ï S v o - H f n s o O N » - < v O « n s o < N i r > m ^ © © v O « o o o » ^ « n r ^ v c > - * T t v o - H O O 
k, r j h h * y e P j O \ q o o » h ; ^ m ^ ^ p j O \ q q o ^ O ; ' l ; n q ^ o ; r j q 
I*, t^ » Oy 9\ O h- t^ £ g m «n f^ > «o 0 0 ^ - * m M « h X O « 0 ( S - " O O O Û ^ ' H O O 
S 5 
i^ v o o N m r ^ o o O N O v o o v ^ © r - « s « n o o © r - m r f r - » s o t s « n o o - H ^ o o < s o o O N 
m m m T f i o m ^ N n c i N N N ^ t i n ^ v i v i t i n v i 
f^  — « © © r ^ r - > o o o N 2 \ — « s© r~- oo oo <s 
VJ O - ^ — « © © © © © ,-* _« _ l ,H 
228 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 35. NO 2 (1980) 
O < S m c o t - * o o - < t Q Q O \ © " < t O 
X o o o « o v o < s 5 Q O v o r ^ r - -* 
QJ - > ^ O 0 O O 0 O O < N O -< 
Q* 
& « h - ^ O O T t O V O v O ^ v O O 
OJ 
^ O O V O « / - > V O O N O O T J - - « O O © 0 \ rs 
o 
!P - H r - O N O N f ^ < s m o o < s < N - ^ - m 
!^ M r t i û \ C r i f N l l f l r t » r t O VO 
•<r v o o N v o v o v o r ^ r - o o v o ^ - O N vo 
<S 
g 
£. o v ^ o o f N - ^ O N ^ f ^ o - ^ ' - ^ <s 
S " ^ - o o O N O O O o r ^ O N O N r - v o f n vo 
3 
p 
£b * m O O - ; ^ ^ ^ n 0 \ ^ «n 
2 «n rn vo vo ' (J\ ^t « v i ^ ir! vo 
^ « o v o - H O N Q ' - H ' - i v o » o Q r - m 
0 0 0 - « 0 « n ^ « < - } < N O O <N 
P1 t N O \ 0 \ f ) h m ^ - < V O O «r> 
si 
O O O O O N O N O N O O O N O O O N O O T J " t— 
^ O N V O O ^ f ^ O ^ O O f S O O O N «O 
•^ Tt *n Tt iri rô r f rn •«* vo "t* •«* 
P » o - * m « n t ~ — < < N " < t s o v o « / - > c 
55 S 
THE UNION WAGE EFFECT RE-EXAMINED 229 
PRA 
BC 
ELT9 
BIGEMP 
LAGPROF 
URBAN 
OLD55 
number of establishments in Canada; from Statistics Canada, 
31-203, 1974. Establishment is defîned as the smallest unit which is a 
separate operating unit capable of reporting certain principal 
statistics; typically a factory, mill or plant. 
The number of employées with completed éducation less than grade 
9, divided by the total number of employées; from Statistics Canada 
1971 Census publication, Industries by Sex Showing Age, Marital 
Status, Level ofSchooling and Class of Workerfor CANADA, No. 
94-749. 
Ratio of the number of employées in establishments employing 200 
or more employées divided by the total number of employées; from 
Statistics Canada, Type ofOrganization and Size of Establishments, 
1974, 31-210. 
Proportion of production and related employées that are female; 
from Statistics Canada 31-203. 
Percent profit before tax on total income excluding investment in-
come; from Statistics Canada, Corporation Financial Statistics, 
1974, 61-207. 
Labour force residing in Census Metropolitan Areas divided by total 
Labour Force. Labour force residing in CMA's is from Statistics 
Canada 1971 Census publication Industries by Sex for Census 
Metropolitan Areas, Place of Résidence and Place of Work 
94-742; total labour force is from 1971 Census publication Industries 
by Sex for Canada, Régions and Provinces, 94-740. 
Employed labour force âge 55 years and over divided by the total 
employed labour force; from Statistics Canada, 1971 Census 
publication, Employed Labour Force by Industry, Age and Sex for 
Canada and Provinces, 94-747. 
Le syndicalisme et les salaires: un réexamen de la théorie 
La raison première de cet article provient d'une étude d'Ashenfelter et de 
Johnson (1972) dans laquelle ils énonçaient ce qui suit: 1° le modèle simple d'équa-
tion salariale, typiquement utilisée pour mesurer l'effet des syndicats sur les salaires, 
est inexact à cause de la présence de variables endogènes parmi les variables ex-
plicatives; 2° l'effet présumé des syndicats sur les salaires est de peu d'importance et 
sans signification quand il est obtenu à partir d'un modèle d'équation simultanée 
plus précis. Les résultats de notre étude confirment la première proposition, mais ils 
démontrent la fausseté de la seconde. 
Nous avons trouvé une preuve solide de dépendance réciproque entre le taux des 
salaires et deux de ses variables explicatives, soit la présence de syndicats et la qualité 
du travail. Cependant, le fait de tenir compte de cette double dépendance ne réduit 
pas l'effet présumé de l'existence des syndicats à néant. Au contraire, nous per-
sistons à déceler que les salaires conventionnels ont un effet considérable et 
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significatif. Les résultats de notre évaluation indiquent que le salaire moyen des 
travailleurs de la production dans les industries manufacturières est supérieur à 4.2 
pour cent en regard d'une différence de 0.10 dans le degré de pénétration syndicale 
(celle-ci étant la proportion de tous les travailleurs de la production liés par une con-
vention collective de travail). Les résultats que nous avons obtenus indiquent aussi 
une différence de 51 pour cent entre les salaires conventionnels et les autres, mais 
l'exactitude de cette estimation dépend, et cela d'une façon décisive, de l'exactitude 
avec laquelle nous pouvons établir le salaire moyen dans une industrie où il n'y a pas 
de syndicat. Parce que notre échantillon n'inclut pas de telles industries et ne con-
tient en réalité que trois industries (sur 40) où le taux de syndicalisation est inférieur à 
50 pour cent, nous avons peu de confiance dans notre estimation pour la différence 
d'ensemble. 
Les résultats d'une évaluation supplémentaire ont été obtenus dans un effort 
pour découvrir les raisons d'estimations disparates de l'effet du salaire conventionnel 
dans la présente étude et dans des études antérieures aux États-Unis et au Canada. 
Quoique ces résultats ne soient pas bien précis, il semble que les différences dans la 
spécification du modèle, les industries sélectionnées et l'ampleur de l'échantillon 
peuvent tous en être responsables. Cependant, les résultats auxquels nous sommes 
arrivés étaient solides dans toutes les expérimentations variées que nous avons 
tentées. Nous soupçonnons, bien que nous n'ayons pu le vérifier à partir des données 
dont nous disposions, que la cause principale de la disparité dans les estimations de 
l'effet du salaire conventionnel obtenues jusqu'ici réside dans les différents niveaux 
d'agrégation sur lesquels les diverses évaluations ont été fondées. 
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